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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
42 U.S.C. 1396(p)
(b)(1) "...the State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance
correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan in the case of the
following individuals:
(A) In the case of an individual described in (a)(1)(B), the State shall seek
adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate or upon sale of the
property subject to a lien imposed on account of medical assistance paid on
behalf of the individual....

(c)(1)(A) ".. .if an institutionalized individual.. .disposes of assets for less than fair
market value on or after the look-back date specified in subparagraph (B)(i), the
individual is ineligible for medical assistance for services...."
(c)(2) "An individual shall not be ineligible for medical assistance by reason of
paragraph (1) to the extent that—
(A) the assets transferred were a home and title to the home was transferred
to~
(ii) a child of such individual who...is blind or permanently and
totally disabled...
(iv) a son or daughter of such individual...who was residing in such
individual's home for a period of at least two years immediately
before the date the individual becomes and institutionalized
individual, and who...provided care to such individual which
permitted such individual to reside at home rather than in such an
institution or facility...."
(See Addendum for complete text of 1396(p)).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellee makes the following additions to and clarifications of the Statement of
the Case, and Statement of the facts presented by Appellant.
1

Following the death of Rulon J. Hone, Alta Hone became the primary beneficiary
under the Trust. (R. 149-155, Finding of Fact 4,5). Alta Hone became ill and required
institutional care. (T. 82, R. 149-155, Finding of Fact 7). Alton Hone, one of the
Trustees of the Trust and the Appellant in this matter, as well as Lloyd Hone, Appellee,
recognized that Medicaid could provide financial assistance for the institutional care. (R.
149-155, Finding of Fact 8). The parties recognized that any assistance provided would
subject her estate to a Medicaid lien or to a statutory right of reimbursement. (R. 149155, Finding of Fact 8).
Lloyd Hone met with Medicaid representatives and advised other family members
that he qualified for a Medicaid exemption that would allow him to remain in the subject
residential property without it being subject to the Medicaid lien. (R. 149-155, Finding of
Fact 9, T. 29). The exemption was based upon the number of years that Lloyd had lived
in the home and provided care to Alta and additionally based upon his status as a disabled
person. (T. 29, 51, 83, 90, Addendum).
Alton recognized prior to conveying the property that under Medicaid regulations,
only certain people could obtain the residential property as a permitted transferee.
(T.30/27 -31/2). Alton recognized that Lloyd was a permitted transferee under Medicaid
(T. 30/27-31/2, 58, 59, 63, 64). Alton recognized that none of the other family members
nor Alta's trust were permitted transferees under Medicaid and that Lloyd was the only
family member who was a permitted transferee. (T. 58, 59, 61, 63, 64). The decision was
made by Alton, as trustee, to transfer the property to Lloyd so that the property would not
2

be taken or liened under the Medicaid provisions. (T. 55, 62). Although Alton knew that
neither he, the trust, nor other family members were permitted transferees, he asserts that
he entered into an agreement, prior to conveying the property, whereby Lloyd would
receive the property in order to avoid the Medicaid lien but hold the property in trust for
Alton and other non-permitted transferee family members. (T. 60, 64, 65 ). It was the
intent of Alton that the deed would transfer the property from the Trust and be held by
Lloyd until the death of Alta, and then that the home would be returned to the Trust for
the benefit of Alton and other family members. (R. 149-155, Finding of Fact 11). The
court below found that the deed was made, prepared and executed for the purpose of
avoiding the Medicaid lien. (R. 149-155, Finding of Fact 12). The Court found the
above arrangement to be a constructive trust, which was not a permitted transferee under
the Medicaid rules (R. 149-155, Finding of Fact 13, 17).
In its Conclusions of Law, the Court concluded that Alton was charged to know
the law and that he could not characterize the conveyance of the property one way when
attempting to obtain Medicaid benefits for Alta (i.e. a transfer to Lloyd Hone, a permitted
transferee, which would remove the property from Alta's estate) but then characterize it a
different way in attempting to enforce a constructive trust (i.e. a conveyance to Lloyd
Hone, acting as a trustee for the beneficiaries, in order to bring the property into Alta's
estate). (R. 149-155, Conclusion of Law 1, 3).
Following a Motion for a New Trial, which was denied, the Court modified the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by its ruling dated March 7, 2002, and
3

concluded that after weighing the evidence and the conduct of the parties, Alton had
unclean hands given, among other things, that Alton intended to use the transfer of
property as a means of avoiding a Medicaid lien and Medicaid's statutory right of
reimbursement. (R. 199, 200). The Court concluded that Alton was not entitled to
equitable relief. (R. 199, 220).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Medicaid rules impose a lien on a recipient's property for reimbursement for
assistance provided to the property owner. This makes sense in that it prevents a property
owner from transferring their property to family members and thereby voluntarily
impoverishing himself in order to receive welfare at taxpayers' expense. Exemptions
exist such that a residential property may be conveyed to persons living with and
providing care for the Medicaid recipient and additionally for a disabled adult child living
with the potential recipient. Lloyd Hone was a permitted transferee under both of these
Medicaid exemptions because he had lived with and provided care for Alta for a period
greater than two years, allowing her to remain at home rather than being institutionalized,
and further because he was an adult child living in the residence. Plaintiff sought to
avoid the Medicaid lien and the statutory right of reimbursement by deeding the
residential property from the express trust to the permitted transferee, Lloyd Hone, after
allegedly entering into an agreement that would place the property in a constructive trust
for the original beneficiaries upon the same terms and conditions of the express trust.
4

This scheme per se violates the Medicaid provisions and constitutes unclean hands on
Alton's part without any further showing of knowledge or wilfulness.
Equity follows the law and a claimant is not entitled to equitable relief when the
equitable relief would, as here, violate legislative enactments. Courts should not be
called upon to aid a man whose cause is founded upon his own illegal act. As found by
the trial court, deeding the home to a trust for the benefit of the beneficiaries would be in
violation of the Medicaid regulations. Plaintiff, by this action, requests the Court to do
that which the Plaintiff may not legally do. The trial court properly refused to do so.
Alton, as trustee, affirmatively (and wilfully) acted to transfer the residential
property, for the purpose of obtaining medical assistance on behalf of Alta Hone, in a
manner calculated to avoid the medicaid lien and the obligation of reimbursement, while
at the same time creating an "understood" constructive trust which retained the very
interests he purported to convey away. Such an act constitutes not only a private wrong
to be weighed in the balancing of the equities, but more importantly constitutes a
significant public wrong. Alton, by asking the court to ratify and finalize his scheme,
seeks to avoid the consequences of the medicaid regulation by creating an interest in the
residential property for himself and other family members, despite the medicaid
prohibitions against such a transfer. The trial court properly exercised its discretion and
weighed the equities in denying the equitable relief requested by the plaintiff.

5

ARGUMENT

I. THE COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT ALTON HAD UNCLEAN
HANDS AND THAT THE REQUESTED EQUITABLE RELIEF WAS,
THEREFORE UNAVAILABLE.
The Medicaid provisions set forth in the Addendum establish as a matter of
law that a person wishing to obtain medical assistance under Medicaid may not dispose
of assets for less than fair market value unless the transferee qualifies as a permitted
transferee under 42 U.S.C. section 1396p(c)(2). If the assets are transferred to an
ineligible person or entity, the medical assistance may not be obtained and a lien will
attach to the asset. (Addendum). Lloyd Hone, as a totally disabled child of a person
seeking medical assistance, and as a child of such individual residing in the residence for
a period of at least two years, who provided care to such individual which permitted such
individual to remain at home rather than being institutionalized, was a permitted
transferee of the residential property. ( Addendum, T. 30, 31, 58, 59, 63, 64). Appellants
now seek a remedy which ignores the medicaid regulations and request that this Court
vest the residential property in Appellants.
The trial court held that the Appellants had come before the court with unclean
hands and were therefore not entitled to the remedy sought. ( R. 149-155, Conclusion of
Law 3, 6, T. 199-201, 220). This ruling is appropriate under Utah law. As stated in
Smith v. Batchelor, 832 P. 2d 467 (Utah 1992)» "equity follows the law. It cannot abridge
an explicit, statutory requirement55 (cites omitted). Warner v. Sirstins, 838 P.2d 666
6

(UtahApp. 1992) unequivocally holds that "although a court, sitting in equity, exercises
discretion in granting or denying relief,...it does not have the authority to ignore existing
principles of law in favor of its view of the equities" (cites omitted). See also Davis v.
Dept. Of Health and Welfare, 943 P. 2d 59 (Idaho App. 1997) and cases cited therein,
holding that "It is well understood that equitable principles cannot supercede the positive
enactment of the legislature."
Under the doctrine of unclean hands, "he who comes into equity must come with
clean hands....The maxim means that equity refuses to lend its aid in any manner to one
seeking its active interposition who has been guilty of unlawful or inequitable conduct in
the matter with relation to which he seeks relief." 30A C.J.S., Equity, section 102 at page
304, 305. The maxim was further described by the United States Supreme Court as
follows:
"It is one of the fundamental principles upon which equity jurisprudence is
founded, that before a complainant can have a standing in court he must first show
that not only has he a good and meritorious cause of action, but he must come into
the court with clean hands. He must be frank and fair with the court, nothing
about the case under consideration should be guarded, but everything that tends to
a full and fair determination of the matters in controversy should be placed before
the court." The governing principle is "that whenever a party who, as actor, seeks
to set the judicial machinery in motion and obtain some remedy, has violated
conscience, or good faith, or other equitable principle, in his prior conduct, then
the doors of the court will be shut against him in limine; the court will refuse to
interfere on his behalf, to acknowledge his right, or to award him any remedy."
Keystone Driller Co, v. General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 244-245 (1933). (Cites
omitted).
Utah courts have similarly refused to assist persons who come before the court
7

with unclean hands. Under Battistone v. American Light and Development Co., 607 P. 2d
837 (Utah 1980), "a court of equity will generally not assist one in extricating himself in
circumstances which he has created." See also Pacific Metal Co. v. Tracy Collins Bank
& Trust Co., 21 Utah 2d 400, 446 P.2d 303 (Utah 1986), "It is a general principle that
one who commits a wrong must take the consequence and then cannot complain that
someone else doesn't rescue him therefrom" and Rohr v. Rohr, 709 P.2d 382 (Utah
1985), "It is generally accepted that equity refuses to lend its aid to a party whose
conduct is inequitable."
Under the Restatement of Contracts, Section 598, " a party to an illegal bargain
can neither recover damages for breach therefore nor, by rescinding the bargain, recover
the performance that he has rendered thereunder or its value, except as stated in Section
599-609." Section 598 was adopted by Utah courts mMcCormick v. Life Insurance
Corp. Of America, 308 P. 2d 949 (Utah 1957). Comment "a" of section 598 of the
Restatement of Contracts states,
When relief is denied, it is because the Plaintiff is a wrongdoer and to such a
person the law denies relief. Courts do not wish to aid a man who founded his
cause of action upon his own immoral or illegal act. If from the plaintiffs own
statement or otherwise it appears that the bargain forming the basis of the action is
opposed to public policy or transgresses statutory prohibitions, the courts
ordinarily give him no assistance. The court's refusal is not for the sake of the
defendant, but because it will not aid such a plaintiff.

Alton's argument that the trial court erred in finding unclean hands because there is no
finding that the transaction was illegal or improper ignores the testimony of Alton Hone
8

and the plain reading of the Medicaid requirements. Medicaid requirements as contained
in 42 U.S.C. section 1396(p) include the following:
(b)(1) "...the State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance
correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan in the case of the
following individuals:
(A) In the case of an individual described in (a)(1)(B), the State shall seek
adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate or upon sale of the
property subject to a lien imposed on account of medical assistance paid on
behalf of the individual....
(c)(1)(A) "...if an institutionalized individual...disposes of assets for less than fair
market value on or after the look-back date specified in subparagraph (B)(i), the
individual is ineligible for medical assistance for services...."
(c)(2) "An individual shall not be ineligible for medical assistance by reason of
paragraph (1) to the extent that—
(A) the assets transferred were a home and title to the home was transferred
to-(ii) a child of such individual who...is blind or permanently and
totally disabled...
(iv) a son or daughter of such individual...who was residing in such
individual's home for a period of at least two years immediately
before the date the individual becomes an institutionalized
individual, and who...provided care to such individual which
permitted such individual to reside at home rather than in such an
institution or facility...."
(Addendum).
Thus, to be exempt, the residential property must be transferred to a permitted transferee.
The evidence is clear that Lloyd Hone was a permitted transferee and the only family
member that was a permitted transferee. (T. 30, 31, 58, 58, 63, 64). Alton knew that
Lloyd was the only permitted transferee. (T. 58, 59, 61, 63, 64).
Appellant argues that there was no intent to "trick" the government. However,
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there is a "trick" if the permitted transaction was simply a sham to obtain medical
assistance from Medicaid and avoid the Medicaid lien and the statutory right of
reimbursement, while the real scheme was the creation of a constructive trust which
would result in the ownership of the residential property by unqualified transferees. This
is what the evidence clearly establishes Alton wanted to do. He wanted to avoid the
medicaid lien and the obligation of reimbursement by conveying the home to Lloyd
without strings attached, as allowed under the Medicaid regulations. ( T. 55, 62).
Because Lloyd refused to implement the illegal portion of the scheme, Alton now
requests the court to do so by creating the constructive trust and ruling that the residential
property belongs to plaintiff. This would be an improper transfer under the Medicaid
guidelines and a violation of the statutory framework regulating persons that may
properly be recipients of the residential property. (Addendum A). The trial court
properly held such a trust to be an impermissible transferee and found the imposition of
the constructive trust to be illegal. (R. 149-155, Conclusion of Law 3, 6).
Alton's unclean hands lie primarily in the fact that while he knew neither he nor
the other beneficiaries of the express trust (other than Lloyd) were permitted transferees
under Medicaid, he sought a transfer of the property to an undisclosed constructive trust
with the intent to avoid the lien, but in reality kept the residential property for the original
unqualified beneficiaries contrary to the Medicaid medical assistance and avoid the lien,
contrary to the Medicaid statute. The trial court properly found this to be the case. (R.
149-155, Finding of Fact 11, 13, 17 and Conclusion of Law 1, 3).
10

II. ALTON HONE COMES BEFORE THE COURT WITH UNCLEAN
HANDS UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH SATISFY ANY
REQUIREMENT OF KNOWLEDGE OR WILFULNESS REQUIRED
UNDER UTAH LAW.
Appellant seeks to impose an element of wilfulness and knowledge that is not
justified under Utah law. Utah law relating to unclean hands and other related rules of
equity imposes no such requirement. As set forth in Point I above, Alton acted with
unclean hands. Alton further acted with sufficient knowledge and wilfulness to satisfy
the doctrine of unclean hands in that he knew, or was deemed to have known, that Lloyd
was the only heir that was a permitted transferee under the medicaid statute and that no
other beneficiary was a permitted transferee. (T. 58, 59, 61, 63, 64). He knew that the
agreement with Lloyd, wherein Lloyd would hold the property in a constructive trust for
the beneficiaries, was for the purpose of avoiding the Medicaid lien and Medicaid's right
of reimbursement. (T. 55, 60, 62, 64, 65). He intended that the transfer would result in
the beneficiaries taking possession of the property even though they were not permitted
transferees, which he was deemed to have known. (T. 60, 64, 65). Although Alton
argues that he did not know that such an agreement was a violation of law, he is charged
with that knowledge. (R. 149-155, Conclusion of Law 1, 3).
There is no further knowledge or wilfulness requirement imposed by Utah law.
First, even the authority cited by Appellants demonstrates that the doctrine of unclean
hands may be used in contexts other than fraud. The doctrine of clean hands is not
limited to fraud but "usually involves fraud, illegality, unfairness, or bad faith." See
11

William J. Lawrence, III, Note, The Application of the Clean Hands Doctrine in Damage
Actions, 57 Notre Dame Law, 673 Notre Dame Lawyer (1982). (emphasis added). See
also Precision Instr. Mfg. Co. v. Automotive M. Mack Co., 324 U.S. 806, 815 (1945)
"Accordingly one's misconduct need not necessarily have been of such a nature as to be
punishable as a crime or as to justify legal proceedings of any character. Any willful act
concerning the cause of action which rightfully can be said to transgress equitable
standards of conduct is sufficient cause for the invocation of the maxim ..." (Emphasis
added). Therefore, it is not necessary that Alton acted with knowledge that his actions
were contrary to law. Alton wilfully acted to retain an interest in the home after transfer
of the asset to a permitted transferee for the purpose of avoiding the medicaid lien and
obtaining medical services on behalf of Alta Hone without the obligation of
reimbursement, contrary to the Medicaid statutes set forth in the Addendum.
(Addendum, T. 60, 64, 65).
It should be noted that Alton is now requesting this court to complete the
transaction contrary to law. Alton can not now say that he is without knowledge that the
transfer of the home must be to a permitted transferee. Even if he originally acted in
ignorance of the law, he is now requesting this court to complete the transaction despite
his present actual knowledge of the medicaid provisions prohibiting transfer to anyone
other than a permitted transferee.
Second, the doctrine of unclean hands may be imposed in Utah with or without
actual knowledge. In Pledger v. Gillespie, 982 P.2d 572,577 (Utah 1999), the Utah
12

Supreme Court rejected a similar defense based upon the plaintiffs argument that an
agreement was unknowingly violated. The Court held,
"We refuse to entertain Dr. Pledger's arguments concerning equitable doctrines
such as laches when it was he who instigated and advanced the litigation in
violation of his Agreement with Cigna-whether knowingly or not—by seeking
payment for his services directly from [defendant] and demanding sums in excess
of the reduced fee. See LHIW, Inc. v. DeLorean, 753 P.2d 961, 963 (Utah 1988)
(stating that 'a party seeking equity must do so with clean hands')."
(Emphasis added).
As a matter of law, Alton is charged with the knowledge that his actions were a
violation of the Medicaid provisions found in Title 42. He wilfully acted to transfer the
assets contrary to medicaid provisions , even if he was unaware at the time that such acts
were prohibited. The court below properly concluded that Alton came before the Court
with unclean hands.

III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION.
BALANCED THE EQUITIES AND CORRECTLY RULED THAT
ALTON'S REQUESTED RELIEF WAS NOT AVAILABLE UNDER THE
CIRCUMSTANCES,

The trial court "weighed all of the evidence and examined the conduct of both
parties" and concluded that Alton is "not entitled to equitable relief." (R. 199, Para 1).
Based upon the equities in this matter, such a conclusion was well within the discretion
of the court. As set forth in Precision Instr. Mfg. Co. v. Automotive M. Mack Co., 324
U.S. 806, 815 (1945), "This maxim necessarily gives wide range to the equity court's use
13

of discretion in refusing to aid the unclean litigant. It is 'not bound by formula or
restrained by any limitation that tends to trammel the free and just exercise of
discretion.'" (cite omitted).
In his balancing of the equities, Alton, as trustee, fails to include a key component
of the equation. Alton's actions not only violate a private interest but a public one as well.
The trial court found that Alton, as trustee, should have known that the transfer of the
residential property into a constructive trust was illegal. (R. 149-155, Conclusion of Law
1, 3). This improper conduct impacts a public interest which weighs heavily in any
balancing of the equities. "Moreover, where a suit in equity concerns the public interest
as well as the private interests of the litigants this doctrine assumed even wider and more
significant proportions. For if an equity court properly uses the maxim to withhold its
assistance in such a case it not only prevents a wrongdoer from enjoying the fruits of his
transgression but averts an injury to the public." See Precision Instr. Mfg. Co. v.
Automotive M. Mack Co., 324 U.S. 806, 815 (1945).
In the present matter, Alton, as trustee, seeks to avoid a medicaid lien or
reimbursement to medicaid for the medical services provided to Alta Hone. (T. 25, 26,
59, 63). To allow surreptitious transfers to a constructive trust creates a procedure for the
avoidance of lawful medicaid liens and rights of reimbursement for future recipients of
medical assistance from medicaid, thereby impacting available public funds. Medicaid
simply does not contemplate such an exception or procedure and the reimbursement
rights of medicaid would be eviscerated by such a court created mechanism for avoiding a
14

medicaid lien or right of reimbursement. The equities involved in the public interest far
outweigh any interest of the undisclosed beneficiaries of the constructive trust.
It should be noted that one of the cases cited by Appellants, at page 14 of his brief,
JankevJanke, 366, KY.S.2d910, 47AD.2d445}

450-451 (N.YAD. 1975), cited for the

proposition that the equities must be weighed, specifically states that "it is a recognized
principle that where a party must trace her cause of action to an illegal transaction there
can be no recovery," and concludes that where there has been a statutory violation, a
party "cannot invoke the power of the equity court to impose a constructive trust...."
(Emphasis added, cites omitted). This is consistent with the finding in the present matter
and demonstrates that even if the equities must be balanced it is not inappropriate for a
court to give great weight to the fact that the proposed transaction would be illegal.
Under such circumstances, it is entirely appropriate to conclude that no relief should be
granted.
The court below properly used its discretion in balancing the equities and
concluded that Alton was not entitled to the requested equitable relief.

CONCLUSION
Alton Hone comes before the court with unclean hands. Alton seeks to avoid the
effects of clear Medicaid regulations by seeking a constructive trust. He is seeking relief
from this Court which contravenes such statutes and which would result in the Court
doing the veiy thing which is unlawful for Alton to do himself. Alton was charged with
15

knowledge of the Medicaid regulations and therefore comes before the court with unclean
hands. He now has actual knowledge of such regulations but persists in seeking the
disallowed relief. Because there is no other requirement of knowledge or wilfulness,
Alton's actions in seeking to obtain an improper transfer of the home contrary to
Medicaid requirements constitutes unclean hands. Because there is both a private and a
significant public interest involved in the present matter, the court below appropriately
balanced the equities and properly exercised its discretion in denying Alton his requested
relief.
Dated this J^

day of March, 2004.
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ADDENDUM
42 U.S.C. 1396(p)
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42 USCS § 1396p

SOCIAL SECURITY ACT

RESEARCH GUIDE
Federal Procedure:
17 Fed Proc L Ed, Health, Education, and Welfare § 42:422.
INTERPRETIVE NOTES AND DECISIONS
1. Validity of regulations
2. Injunctive relief
1. Validity of regulations
Medicaid recipients' challenge to federal regulation implementing 42 USCS § 1396o(a)(3), which
requires copayments to be "nominal in amount,'*
must fail, even though copayment for inpatient hospital services in Kansas is $325, where Congress has
adopted, parenthetically in statute, definition of
"nominal in amount" long codified in 42 CFR
§ 447.54(c), because court is bound by Secretary's
interpretation, since it has been given force and effeet of law by legislative reenactment and ratification. Kansas Hosp. Ass'n v Whiteman (1994, DC
Kan) 851 F Supp 401, 44 Soc Sec Rep Serv 524.
2. Injunctive relief
State is temporarily restrained from implementing
amendment to increase co-payment requirement of
Medicaid beneficiaries from $25 to $325 per admission for inpatient hospital services, where hospitals
and individuals showed that amendment may cause
them irreparable harm, outweighing any potential
damage caused state by delay, and that public inter-

est favors enforcement of public policy as expressed
in Medicaid statutes and regulations, because plaintiffs make viable claim that proposed increase runs
afoul of 42 USCS § 1396o requirement that any cost
sharing be ''norninal.'' Kansas Hosp. Ass'n vWhiteman (1993, DC Kan) 835 F Supp 1548,42 Soc Sec
Rep Serv 708.
Preliminary injunction is denied hospitals and
individuals challenging proposed amendment to state
Medicaid plan, where state submitted evidence
showing that proposed increase of co-payment to
$325 was determined after applying 50 percent to
average, or typical, amount agency pays for each day
of inpatient hospital care for Medicaid recipients,
because plaintiffs are not likely to prevail on their
claim that proposed co-payment is not ''nominal in
amount" as required by 42 USCS § 1396o(a)(3),
(b)(3), since amount is consistent with federal regulations permitting state to imposefixedco-payment
amount for inpatient hospital care. Kansas Hosp.
Ass'n v Whiteman (1993, DC Kan) 835 F Supp
1556, 42 Soc Sec Rep Serv 716, 4 ADD 321, affd
without op sub nom Williams v Whiteman (1994,
CA10 Kan) 36 F3d 1106, reported in full (1994,
CA10 Kan) 1994 US App LEXIS 25798.

§ 1396p. Liens, adjustments and recoveries, and transfers of assets
(a) Imposition of lien against the property of an individual on account of
medical assistance rendered to him under a State plan. (1) No lien may
be imposed against the property of any individual prior to his death on account of medical assistance paid or to be paid on his behalf under the State
plan, except—
(A) pursuant to the judgment of a court on account of benefits incorrectly
paid on behalf of such individual, or
(B) in the case of the real property of an individual—
(i) who is an inpatient in a nursing facility, intermediate care facility
for the mentally retarded, or other medical institution, if such individual is required, as a condition of receiving services in such institution
under the State plan, to spend for costs of medical care all but a
minimal amount of his income required for personal needs, and
(ii) with respect to whom the State determines, after notice and opportunity for a hearing (in accordance with procedures established by
the State), that he cannot reasonably be expected to be discharged from
the medical institution and to return home,
except as provided in paragraph (2).
(2) No lien may be imposed under paragraph (1)(B) on such individual's
home if—
QK1

(A) the spouse of such individual,
(B) such individual's child who is under age 21, or (with respect to States
eligible to participate in the State program established under title XVI [42
USCS §§ 1381 et seq.]) is blind or permanently and totally disabled, or
(with respect to States which are not eligible to participate in such
program) is blind or disabled as defined in section 1614 [42 USCS
§ 1382c], or
(C) a sibling of such individual (who has an equity interest in such home
and who was residing in such individual's home for a period of at least
one year immediately before the date of the individual's admission to the
medical institution),
is lawfully residing in such home.
(3) Any hen imposed with respect to an individual pursuant to paragraph
(1)(B) shall dissolve upon that individual's discharge from the medical
institution and return home.
(b) Adjustment or recovery of medical assistance correctly paid under a
State plan. (1) No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan may be made,
except that the State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan in the
case of the following individuals:
(A) In the case of an individual described in subsection (a)(1)(B), the
State shall seek adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate or
upon sale of the property subject to a lien imposed on account of medicai
assistance paid on behalf of the individual
(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or older when
the individual received such medical assistance, the State shall seek
adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate, but only for medical
assistance consisting of—
(i) nursing facility services, home and community-based services, and
related hospital and prescription drug services, or
(ii) at the option of the State, any items or services under the State pl^n.
(C)(i) In the case of an individual who has received (or is entitled to
receive) benefits under a long-term care insurance policy in connection
with which assets or resources are disregarded in the manner described
in clause (ii), except as provided in such clause, the State shall seek
adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate on account of medical assistance paid on behalf of the individual for nursing facility and
other long-term care services.
(ii) Clause (i) shall not apply in the case of an individual who received
medical assistance under a State plan of a State which had a State plan
amendment approved as of May 14, 1993, which provided for the disregard of any assets or resources—
(I) to the extent that payments are made under a long-term care insurance policy; or
(II) because an individual has received (or is entitled to receive)
benefits under a long-term care insurance policy.
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(2) Any adjustment or recovery under paragraph (1) may be made only after
the death of the individual's surviving spouse, if any, and only at a time—
(A) when he has no surviving child who is under age 21, or (with respect
to States eligible to participate in the State program established under title
XVI [42 USCS §§ 1381 et seq.]) is blind or permanently and totally disabled, or (with respect to States which are not eligible to participate in
such program) is blind or disabled as defined in section 1614 [42 USCS
§ 1382c]; and
(B) in the case of a lien on an individual's home under subsection
(a)(1)(B), when—
(i) no sibling of the individual (who was residing in the individual's
home for a period of at least one year immediately before the date of
the individual's admission to the medical institution), and
(ii) no son or daughter of the individual (who was residing in the
individual's home for a period of at least two years immediately before
the date of the individual's admission to the medical institution, and
who establishes to the satisfaction of the State that he or she provided
care to such individual which permitted such individual to reside at
home rather than in an institution),
is lawfully residing in such home who has lawfully resided in such home
on a continuous basis since the date of the individual's admission to the
medical institution.
(3) The State agency shall establish procedures (in accordance with standards specified by the Secretary) under which the agency shall waive the
application of this subsection (other than paragraph (1)(C)) if such application would work an undue hardship as determined on the basis of criteria
established by the Secretary.
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term "estate", with respect to a
deceased individual—
(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included
within the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate
law; and
(B) may include, at the option of the State (and shall include, in the case
of an individual to'whom paragraph (l)(C)(i) applies), any other real and
personal property and other assets in which the individual had any legal
title or interest at the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life
estate, living trust, or other arrangement.
(c) Taking into account certain transfers of assets. (1)(A) In order to meet
the requirements of this subsection for purposes of section 1902(a)(18)
[42 USCS § 1396a(a)(18)], the State plan must provide that if an
institutionalized individual or the spouse of such an individual (or, at the
option of a State, a noninstitutionalized individual or the spouse of such
an individual) disposes of assets for less than fair market value on or after the look-back date specified in subparagraph (B)(i), the individual is
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ineligible for medical assistance for services described in subparagraph
(C)(i) (or, in the case of a noninstitutionalized individual, for the services
described in subparagraph (C)(ii)) during the period beginning on the date
specified in subparagraph (D) and equal to the number of months specified in subparagraph (E).
(B)(i) The look-back date specified in this subparagraph is a date that is
36 months (or, in the case of payments from a trust or portions of a
trust that are treated as assets disposed of by the individual pursuant to
paragraph (3)(A)(iii) or (3)(B)(ii) of subsection (d), 60 months) before
the date specified in clause (ii).
(ii) The date specified in this clause, with respect to—
(I) an institutionalized individual is the first date as of which the individual both is an institutionalized individual and has applied for
medical assistance under the State plan, or
(II) a noninstitutionalized individual is the date on which the individual applies for medical assistance under the State plan or, if later,
the date on which the individual disposes of assets for less than fair
market value.
(C)(i) The services described in this subparagraph with respect to an
institutionalized individual are the following:
(I) Nursing facility services.
(II) A level of care in any institution equivalent to that of nursing
facility services.
(III) Home or community-based services furnished under a waivfer
granted under subsection (c) or (d) of section 1915 [42 USCS
§ 1396n(c) or (d)J.
(ii) The services described in this subparagraph with respect to a
noninstitutionalized individual are services (not including any service$
described in clause (i)) that are described in paragraph (7), (22), or (24)
of section 1905(a) [42 USCS § 1396d(a)(7), (22), or (24)], and, at the
option of a State, other long-term care services for which medical assistance is otherwise available under the State plan to individuals
requiring long-term care.
(D) The date specified in this subparagraph is the first day of the first
month during or after which assets have been transferred for less than fair
market value and which does not occur in any other periods of ineligibility under this subsection.
(E)(i) With respect to an institutionalized individual, the number of
months of ineligibility under this subparagraph for an individual shall
be equal to—
(I) the total, cumulative uncompensated value of all assets transferred
by the individual (or individual's spouse) on or after the look-back
date specified in subparagraph (B)(i), divided by
(II) the average monthly cost to a private patient of nursing facility
services in the State (or, at the option of the State, in the community
in which the individual is institutionalized) at the time of application.
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(ii) With respect to a noninstitutionalized individual, the number of
months of ineligibility under this subparagraph for an individual shall
not be greater than a number equal to—
(I) the total, cumulative uncompensated value of all assets transferred
by the individual (or individual's spouse) on or after the look-back
date specified in subparagraph (B)(i), divided by
(II) the average monthly cost to a private patient of nursing facility
services in the State (or, at the option of the State, in the community
in which the individual is institutionalized) at the time of application.
(iii) The number of months of ineligibility otherwise determined under
clause (i) or (ii) with respect to the disposal of an asset shall be
reduced—
(I) in the case of periods of ineligibility determined under clause (i),
by the number of months of ineligibility applicable to the individual
under clause (ii) as a result of such disposal, and
(II) in the case of periods of ineligibility determined under clause
(ii), by the number of months of ineligibility applicable to the individual under clause (i) as a result of such disposal.
(2) An individual shall not be ineligible for medical assistance by reason of
paragraph (1) to the extent that—
(A) the assets transferred were a home and title to the home was
transferred to—
(i) the spouse of such individual;
(ii) a child of such individual who (I) is under age 21, or (II) (with respect to States eligible to participate in the State program established
under title XVI [42 USCS §§ 1381 et seq.]) is blind or permanently and
totally disabled, or (with respect to States which are not eligible to
participate in such program) is blind or disabled as defined in section
1614 [42 USCS § 1382c];
(iii) a sibling of such individual who has an equity interest in such
home and who was residing in such individual's home for a period of
at least one year immediately before the date the individual becomes
an institutionalized individual; or
(iv) a son or daughter of such individual (other than a child described
in clause (ii)) who was residing in such individual's home for a period
of at least two years immediately before the date the individual
becomes an institutionalized individual, and who (as determined by the
State) provided care to such individual which permitted such individual to reside at home rather than in such an institution or facility;
(B) the assets—
(i) were transferred to the individual's spouse or to another for the sole
benefit of the individual's spouse,
(ii) were transferred from the individual's spouse to another for the sole
benefit of the individual's spouse,
(iii) were transferred to, or to a trust (including a trust described in
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subsection (d)(4)) established solely for the benefit of, the individual's
child described in subparagraph (A)(ii)(II), or
(iv) were transferred to a trust (including a trust described in subsection (d)(4)) established solely for the benefit of an individual under 65
years of age who is disabled (as defined in section 1614(a)(3)) [42
USCS § 1382c(a)(3)l;
(C) a satisfactory showing is made to the State (in accordance with
regulations promulgated by the Secretary) that (i) the individual intended
to dispose of the assets either at fair market value, or for other valuable
consideration, (ii) the assets were transferred exclusively for a purpose
other than to qualify for medical assistance, or (iii) all assets transferred
for less than fair market value have been returned to the individual; or
(D) the State determines, under procedures established by the State (in
accordance with standards specified by the Secretary), that the denial of
eligibility would work an undue hardship as determined on the basis of
criteria established by the Secretary; [.]
(3) For purposes of this subsection, in the case of an asset held by an individual in common with another person or persons in a joint tenancy, tenancy
in common, or similar arrangement, the asset (or the affected portion of such
asset) shall be considered to be transferred by such individual when any action is taken, either by such individual or by any other person, that reduces
or eliminates such individual's ownership or control of such asset.
(4) A State (including a State which has elected treatment under section
1902(f) [42 USCS § 1396a(f)]) may not provide for any period of ineligibility for an individual due to transfer of resources for less than fair market
value except in accordance with this subsection. In the case of a transfer by
the spouse of an individual which results in a period of ineligibility for medical assistance under a State plan for such individual, a State shall, using a
reasonable methodology (as specified by the Secretary), apportion such period of ineligibility (or any portion of such period) among the individual atip
the individual's spouse if the spouse otherwise becomes eligible for medical
assistance under the State plan.
(5) In this subsection, the term *'resources" has the meaning given suqjt*
term in section 1613 [42 USCS § 1382b], without regard to the exclusion
described in subsection (a)(1) thereof.
(d) Treatment of trust amounts. (1) For purposes of determining an individual's eligibility for, or amount of, benefits under a State plan under this titlf/
[42 USCS §§ 1396 et seqj, subject to paragraph (4), the rules specified ill4
paragraph (3) shall apply to a trust established by such individual
(2)(A) For purposes of this subsection, an individual shall be considered tQ^
have established a trust if assets of the individual were used to form al|
or part of the corpus of the trust and if any of the following individuals
established such trust other than by will:
(i) The individual,
(ii) The individual's spouse,
(iii) A person, including a court or administrative body, with legal
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authority to act in place of or on behalf of the individual or the
individual's spouse.
(iv) A person, including any court or administrative body, acting at the
direction or upon the request of the individual or the individual's
spouse.
(B) In the case of a trust the corpus of which includes assets of an individual (as determined under subparagraph (A)) and assets of any other
person or persons, the provisions of this subsection shall apply to the portion of the trust attributable to the assets of the individual.
(C) Subject to paragraph (4), this subsection shall apply without regard
to—
(i) the purposes for which a trust is established,
(ii) whether the trustees have or exercise any discretion under the trust,
(hi) any restrictions on when or whether distributions may be made
from the trust, or
(iv) any restrictions on the use of distributions from the trust.
(3)(A) In the case of a revocable trust—
(i) the corpus of the trust shall be considered resources available to the
individual,
(ii) payments from the trust to or for the benefit of the individual shall
be considered income of the individual, and
(iii) any other payments from the trust shall be considered assets
disposed of by the individual for purposes of subsection (c).
(B) In the case of an irrevocable trust—
(i) if there are any circumstances under which payment from the trust
could be,made to or for the benefit of the individual, the portion of the
corpus from which, or the income on the corpus from which, payment
to the individual could be made shall be considered resources available
to the individual, and payments from that portion of the corpus or
income—
(I) to or for the benefit of the individual, shall be considered income
of the individual, and
(II) for any other purpose, shall be considered a transfer of assets by
the individual subject to subsection (c); and
(ii) my portion of the trust from which, or any income on the corpus
from which, no payment could under any circumstances be made to the
individual shall be considered, as of the date of establishment of the
trust (or, if later, the date on which payment to the individual was
foreclosed) to be assets disposed by the individual for purposes of
subsection (c), and the value of the trust shall be determined for
purposes of such subsection by including the amount of any payments
made from such portion of the trust after such date.
(4) This subsection shall not apply to any of the following trusts:
(A) A trust containing the assets of an individual under age 65 who is
disabled (as defined in section 1614(a)(3) [42 USCS § 1382c(a)(3)]) and
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which is established for the benefit of such individual by a parent,
grandparent, legal guardian of the individual, or a court if the State will
receive all amounts remaining in the trust upon the death of such individual up to an amount equal to the total medical assistance paid on behalf
of the individual under a State plan under this title [42 USCS §§ 1396 et
seq.}.
(B) A trust established in a State for the benefit of an individual if—
(i) the trust is composed only of pension, Social Security, and other
income to the individual (and accumulated income in the trust),
(ii) the State will receive all amounts remaining in the trust upon the
death of such individual up to an amount equal to the total medical assistance paid on behalf of the individual under a State plan under this
title [42 USCS §§ 1396 et seq.], and
(iii) the State makes medical assistance available to individuals described in section 1902(a)(10)(A)(ii)(V) [42 USCS § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(V)], but does not make such assistance available to individuals for
nursing facility services under section 1902(a)(10)(C) [42 USCS
§ 1396a(a)(10)(C)].
(C) A trust containing the assets of an individual who is disabled (as
defined in section 1614(a)(3)) [42 USCS § 1382c(a)(3)] that meets the
following conditions:
(i) The trust is established and managed by a non-profit association,
(ii) A separate account is maintained for each beneficiary of the trust,
but, for purposes of investment and management of funds, the trust
pools these accounts.
(iii) Accounts in the trust are established solely for the benefit of
individuals who are disabled (as defined in section 1614(a)(3)) [42
USCS § 1382c(a)(3)] by the parent, grandparent, or legal guardian of
such individuals, by such individuals, or by a court,
(iv) To the extent that amounts remaining in the beneficiary's account
upon the death of the beneficiary are not retained by the trust, the trust
pays to the State from such remaining amounts in the account an
amount equal to the total amount of medical assistance paid on behalf
of the beneficiary under the State plan under this title [42 USCS
§§ 1396 et seq.].
(5) The State agency shall establish procedures (in accordance with standards specified by the Secretary) under which the agency waives the application of this subsection with respect to all individual if the individual
establishes that such application would wdrk an undue hardship on the individual as determined on the basis of criteria established by the Secretary.
(6) The term "trust" includes any legal instrument or device that is similar
to a trust but includes an annuity only to such extent and in such manner as
the Secretary specifies.
(e) Definitions. In this section, the following definitions shall apply:
(1) The term "assets", with respect to an individual, includes all income and
resources of the individual and of the individual's spouse, including any
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income or resources which the individual or such individual's spouse is
entitled to but does not receive because of action—
(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse,
(B) by a person, including a court or administrative body, with legal
authority to act in place of or on behalf of the individual or such
individual's spouse, or
(C) by any person, including any court or administrative body, acting at
the direction or upon the request of the individual or such individual's
spouse.
(2) The term ' 'income" has the meaning given such term in section 1612
[42 USCS § 1382a].
(3) The term "institutionalized individual" means an individual who is an
inpatient in a nursing facility, who is an inpatient in a medical institution and
with respect to whom payment is made based on a level of care provided in
a nursing facility, or who is described in section 1902(a)(10)(A)(ii)(VI) [42
USCS § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(VI)].
(4) The term "noninstitutionalized individual" means an individual receiving any of the services specified in subsection (c)(l)(C)(ii).
(5) The term "resources" has the meaning given such term in section 1613
[42 USCS § 1382b], without regard (in the case of an institutionalized individual) to the exclusion described in subsection (a)(1) of such section.
(Aug. 14, 1935, ch 531, Title XIX, § 1917, as added Sept. 3, 1982, P. L. 97248, Title I, Subtitle B, § 132(b), 96 Stat. 370; Jan. 12, 1983, P. L. 97-448,
Title m , § 309(b)(21), (22); 96 Stat. 2410; Dec. 22, 1987, P. L. 100-203, Title
IV, Subtitle C, Part 2, §4211(h)(12), 101 Stat. 1330-208; July 1, 1988, P. L.
100-360, Title ffl, § 303(b), Title IV, Subtitle B, § 411(1)(3)(1), 102 Stat. 760,
803; Oct. 13, 1988, P. L. 100-485, Title VI, § 608(d)(16)(B), 102 Stat. 2417;
Dec. 19, 1989, P.L. 101-239, Title VI, Subtitle B, Part 2, § 6411(e)(1), 103
Stat. 2271; Aug. 10, 1993, P.L. 103-66, Title XIII, Ch 2, Subch B, Part II,
§§ 13611(aMc), 13612(aMc), 107 Stat. 622, 627.)
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES
Explanatory notes:
The bracketed period has been added at the end of subsec. (c)(2)(D) to
indicate the probable intent of Congress to include such punctuation.
Effective date of section:
Act Sept. 3, 1982, P. L. 97-248, Title I, Subtitle B, § 132(d), 96 Stat. 373,
which appears as a note to this section, provided in part that this section
"shall become effective on the date of the enactment of this Act [enacted
Sept. 3, 1982].".
Amendments:
1983. Act Jan. 12, 1982 (effective as if originally included as a part of this
section as added by Act Sept. 3, 1982, as provided by § 309(c)(2) of the
1983 Act, which appears as 42 USCS § 426-1 note), in subsec. (b)(2)(B),
in the concluding matter, substituted "who has lawfully resided" for "and
V i a e 1 m i r f i i l l x r *•£» 0 1 / 4 ^ / 4 ' ' * ot-»/4 i n o i m c a ^

I n\C~i\(\i\(\f*

\

i*\

ciiK/»1

fT\

o»iVkr»*-*+n*-£n4

